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to generate more than three degrees of global warming by 2100. 5 The accord also contains starting points for the other parts of the Bali Action Plan. 6 <1>The EU at Copenhagen</1>
Compared to previous climate negotiations, the EU seemed well prepared going into Copenhagen. European leaders had used previous forums such as the G8, G20, and the package, the EU had also established the basic policy framework for achieving these objectives. 8 In addition, the EU had made ambitious commitments on financing low carbon technologies and adaptation. On the surface, European negotiators also seemed better organized than in the past. Lack of flexibility in negotiations has been an eternal problem for the EU, with much time wasted on coordination among European delegations and little time and resources left for outreach and negotiations with partners. An improved system of designated "issue leaders" and "lead negotiators" responsible for particular topics, in place since 2004, had over time brought greater coherence to the EU position in climate negotiations. 9 
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Yet it is quite clear that, apart from partial successes as the endorsement of the 2°C target in the Accord and the provision of "fast track finance", the EU did not succeed in pulling its weight at Copenhagen. 10 One of the reasons was an ineffective Danish COP presidency. A leaked Danish draft of a possible resolution had alienated developing countries during the first week, followed by a clumsy handover of the Presidency from the Danish Environment
Minister, Connie Hedegaard, to the Prime Minister, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who, overwhelmed with the diplomatic and procedural nuts and bolts of the negotiations, had to step down during the arduous last night of the summit. 11 The Swedish EU presidency and in particular its Prime Minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, were also widely seen as ineffective.
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But the European failure at Copenhagen was not due to its leaders' performance alone.
There were more fundamental issues at stake. First, the European negotiating position misjudged the grounds on which it was possible to seek reciprocity. 13 Since it entered the negotiations with a firm target, the EU had little negotiating leverage. Its "big carrot"-the willingness to go up to -30 percent emissions reductions-received no counter offers because it failed to target the concerns of the other large emitters. The EU, Japan, and to some extent also group of countries that laid the basis for the Copenhagen Accord. 14 To some extent, these changed relations may now be a fact of life that the EU must learn to accept-the climate that Europeans are granted is the climate the Chinese, Americans, and Indians, as the main emitters, give them.
Last, and perhaps most traumatic for European self esteem, Copenhagen showed that its mental model of a climate regime was not widely shared. Europeans have been deeply invested in the "Kyoto model" of coordinated emissions control, based on top-down, agreements involving a big number of state parties (large-n agreements) and "grand deals"-funding and technology in exchange for emissions limitations. But after Copenhagen, the climate regime seems to be moving towards a model that emphasizes 6 bottom-up pledges by countries, small-n negotiations and a focus on monitoring and reporting mechanisms. 15 The experience of Copenhagen, which UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown described as "at best flawed and at worst chaotic," 16 provoked many bitter responses across Europe.
Commission President Barroso called the accord "a positive step but clearly below our ambitions." He also said: "I will not hide my disappointment." 17 Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor, echoed this by admitting that "the decision has been very difficult for me. We have done one step, we have hoped for several more." 18 The Swedish presidency was quick to label the conference "a disaster" that "was mainly about other countries really (being) Copenhagen also has important consequences for the EU's internal climate policies. The absence of a globally binding climate agreement is likely to increase internal fragmentation and disagreements on the appropriate level of climate policy ambition in the EU. As in other policy domains, enlargement has already complicated decision-making on EU climate and energy policy, and these divisions look set to get deeper.
Even in this context, it is clear that some climate policies, such as the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) and policies on renewables, will continue to be pursued, because of their co-benefits and innovation value. But for others, the going may get tougher. The concerns over competitiveness that have been so dominant in the U.S. debate also loom large in Europe, especially in the current economic crisis. Furthermore, the failure of Copenhagen, which was preceded and accompanied by unprecedented media coverage and high expectations, has produced a sense of disappointment which, in combination with 'climate gate', the cold winter and the recession, has created an opportunity for skeptics and opponents of ambitious climate policy to turn public opinion in their favor. Climate politics, which seemed to provide only advantages to European political leaders, has become more fraught with difficulty, with no guarantees of success. Merkel, Sarkozy, and Brown all came away from Copenhagen looking like losers to their domestic constituencies. Without any doubt, large-scale public mobilization on the climate issue has taken place over the last several years, and powerful green lobbies have emerged that will seek to resist a policy
turnaround. Yet the extent to which they can counter-balance the current "climate backlash" remains to be seen.
<1>Conclusions</1>
The EU did not achieve what it wanted to at Copenhagen. in shaping the regime to the degree it wants to, or influence others by ambitious targetsetting. However, its industrial and technological leadership-leading the way to a lowcarbon economy, as discussed above-will be a much sought-after competence also in a post-Kyoto world. Third, while continuing to build bridges with the developing world at large, the EU will need to shift the focus of its attention towards the "big polluters" and learn to pursue realist climate politics in which coalitions are sought with strong and not only with weak players.
Copenhagen will also have repercussions for EU domestic climate policy. A renewed internal debate about the speed with which the EU goes about reducing emissions is already under way, as reflected in the Commission's pending impact assessment of the policies required to implement a 30 percent emissions cut by 2020. Given the failed attempt of "leading by example" at Copenhagen, the primary arguments for emission cuts may in the future be less linked to the EU's international strategy, but be framed more strongly in terms of cobenefits, technological leadership, and the growth of new leading sectors of the economy, as well as concerns about energy security. Furthermore, there will also need to be a profound readjustment of policy towards adaptation. While the 2°C target has been endorsed in the Copenhagen Accord, the pledges received by the end of January deadline speak a different language. The EU and the rest of the world will now need to look towards a 3°C or 4°C world by the end of this century, with continued warming beyond that. This 12 requires getting over the schizophrenia that has existed at the heart of EU climate policy:
whether to mitigate or whether to adapt. Climate policy needs to be both, with the balance of effort after Copenhagen swinging more strongly towards adaptation. 
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